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**THE VOLUNTARY OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT FIRMS SWITCHING
WITH MODIFIED AUDITOR'S OPINION AS MEDIATION VARIABLES****自愿性会计师事务所转换，以经修改的审计师的意见作为调解变量****Retna Safriliana^{a,*}, Bambang Subroto^b, Imam Subekti^b, Aulia Fuad Rahman^b**^aUniversity of Merdeka MalangJl. Terusan Raya Dieng No.62-64, Malang, Indonesia, retna.safriliana@unmer.ac.id^bUniversity of Brawijaya MalangJl. Veteran, Malang, Indonesia, bambang@ub.ac.id, subekti@ub.ac.id, fuad_ub@ub.ac.id*Received: September 15., 2020* ▪ *Review: November 10, 2020* ▪ *Accepted: December 15, 2020**This article is an open-access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0>)***Abstract**

This article describes the factors that influence the voluntary switching of *public accounting firms*, with modified auditor opinion as a mediating variable, in nine Southeast Asia and East Asian countries on the basis of explanatory research. The data for the period of 2014 to 2018 are obtained from the Osiris database, which provided a total sample of 27.740 manufacturing companies in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, Japan, China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. The data analysis technique used is stepwise logistic regression, and the modified Zmijewski model using discriminant analysis is applied to measure the financial distress variable. The results of the study indicate that companies experiencing financial distress, have large assets, and are audited by non-big four audit firms tend to make public accountant firm switching before the specified time. In companies that experience financial distress and tend to decide on voluntary public accountant firm switching, there is partial mediation of the auditor's opinion apart from an unqualified opinion. This means that companies experiencing financial distress tend to get an auditor's opinion apart from an unqualified opinion such that the company switches its public accountant firm before the mandated five years. Companies from the Philippines, Japan, and China are the most orderly in obeying the rules for voluntary public accountant firm switching, whereas those from Indonesia and China are the least orderly. This study is useful for policy on auditor switching implemented by the ASEAN Certified Public Accountant and East Asia to maintain the independency of public accountant firms and auditors in Asia.

Keywords: Voluntary of Public Accountant Firms, Financial Distress, Firms' Size, Auditor Reputation, Modified Auditor's Opinion

摘要 本文在解释性研究的基础上，描述了在九个东南亚和东亚国家中，以修改后的审计师意见为中介变量，影响公共会计师事务所自愿转换的因素。2014年至2018年期间的数据是从奥西里斯数据库中获得的，该数据库提供了印度尼西亚，马来西亚，新加坡，泰国，菲律宾，日本，中国大陆，香港和台湾的27,740家制造公司的总样本。所使用的数据分析技术是逐步逻辑回归，并且使用判别分析的改进兹米耶夫斯基模型应用于度量财务困境变量。研究结果表明，遭受财务困扰，资产庞大，并由非四大会计师事务所审计的公司往往会在指定时间之前转换会计师事务所。在经历财务困境并倾向于决定自愿进行公共会计师事务所转换的公司中，除了无保留意见外，还部分地调解了审计师的意见。这意味着遭受财务困扰的公司往往会获得无保留意见的审计意见，从而使公司在规定的五年内更换其会计师事务所。菲律宾，日本和中国的公司在遵守自愿性会计师事务所转换规则方面最有秩序，而印度尼西亚和中国的公司则最不秩序。这项研究对于由东盟注册会计师和东亚实施的审计师转换政策非常有用，以保持亚洲地区公共会计师事务所和审计师的独立性。

关键词: 自愿会计师事务所，财务困境，事务所规模，审计师声誉，修改后的审计意见

I. INTRODUCTION

The role of public accountants is crucial in ensuring the transparency and accountability of public company's financial reports so that investors and users of the reports have confidence in their content [1]. Regulations on the switching of public accountant firms (PAFs) in Indonesia are covered by the Republic of Indonesia Government Regulation Number 20 of 2015, which specifies that the practice of public accountants providing audit services for financial information should be no longer than five consecutive years [2]. Auditor switching in Malaysia is regulated by the Malaysia Institute of Accountants (MIA) for a period of five years [3]. Meanwhile, Singapore regulatory about Accounting and Corporate Register of Public Accountants state that PAFs must comply with the rules set by the *Singapore Standards on Auditing* and set auditor switching to occur within a period of five years [35]. According to JICPA (*Japan Institute of Certified Public Accountants*, which is a professional body of accountants in Japan) [4] in Japan, audit partner rotation should be carried out within a period of five years. PAF switching also occurs in East Asian countries. As stated by Bandyopadhyay, Chen, and Yu [5], mandatory auditor switching in China is carried out every five years.

Chadegani, Mohamed, and Jari [6] also stated that financial distress and management changes have positive effects on auditor switching, whereas the qualification audit opinion and audit fees have negative effects on auditor switching. Other studies show different results, that companies that get a qualified audit opinion tend to do auditor switching [7], which in turn reduces the companies' confidence in the audit profession

[8]. Voluntary PAF switching also occurs in other countries. Budisantoso and Probodono [9] showed that the PAF switching of non-big four firms in Southeast Asia is caused by corporate governance. Wang and Xin [10] stated that auditor switching is caused by the dissatisfaction with audit results, which occurred in cross-border companies from China and Hong Kong to improve earnings quality. Nazrie et al. [34] showed the relationship between company complexity and auditor switching. Budisantoso et al. [11] also stated that the condition of corporate governance consisting of an audit committee and an independent commission has a negative impact on PAF switching. Corporate governance is the party that concerns policies in PAF switching.

This research was conducted using manufacturing companies in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore, Japan, China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. The reason for using a manufacturing company for a company is to generate trade between countries (i.e., exports and imports). The selection of countries in Southeast Asia and East Asia is based on the globalization between the developing countries in these regions [12], [13], [14], [15], [16]. The present study aims to examine and analyze the existence of the positive effect of financial distress and the negative effects of firm size and auditor reputation as well as examine the positive effect of the financial distress variable on voluntary PAF switching, with modified auditor's opinion (an opinion issued by the auditor, other than an unqualified opinion) as the mediating variable, in the voluntary switching of PAFs in Southeast Asia and East Asia.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

Jensen and Meckling [17] describe the agency relationship as one that occurs because of an agreement contract between an agent and the principal, with the purpose of carrying out tasks that are in the interests of the principal. Watts and Zimmerman [18] present the contracting theory, which states that the relationship between company management and auditors must be based on a strong agreement or contract. Meanwhile, information theory [19] states that accurate financial statements can be used as information for audit report decisions. The decision-making process based on financial statements is presented by management. For auditors, pre-audited financial statements can also be used as a consideration to obtain information on audit risk considerations. As stated by Elder et al. [37], reliable information can reduce the risks associated with independent audits. According to Vroom [38], expectancy theory states that if someone wants something, then it will be achieved if someone strives to get the best results.

A. Hypothesis Development

1) Relationship between Financial Distress and Voluntary Switching of PAFs

In the situation presented by Chadegani et al. [6] in their research on 182 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange from 2003 to 2007, it was shown that client size is negatively related to PAF switching. Similar to the research of Naslmosavi et al. [20], states that there is a relationship between firms size and auditor independence. Luypaert & Caneghem [21] also stated that the company level is one of the agency factors influencing auditor switching. This means that companies with financial distress problems will tend to PAF switching to have better opinion results. The *big four* accounting firm type factors tend to produce *qualified* opinions in companies experiencing financial distress. Budisantoso & Probohudono [9] stated that companies in Southeast Asia had conducted opinion shopping, especially for companies experiencing financial distress. The researchers have suspected that one of the factors causing voluntary PAF switching is the company's financial distress, which is formulated in the following hypothesis:

H1: Financial distress has a positive effect on voluntary PAF switching.

2) Relationship between Firms Size and Voluntary PAF Switching

Luypaert & Caneghem [21] stated that the company level is one of the agency factors influencing auditor switching. Abidin, Ishaya, &

M-nor [22], in their research on 712 non-financial companies listed on the Malaysia Stock Exchange from 2009 to 2011, also stated that one of the auditor switching causes is the company size. It is consistent with Sihotang [36] that the company's growth is negatively related to auditor switching, meaning that the bigger companies do not do auditor switching and vice versa. The small category companies tend to do auditor switching. Based on studies that show a relationship between firms size and a PAF switching, it shows that large companies tend to choose the big four PAF and vice versa. It strengthens the researchers' suspicion that firms size harms PAF switching, meaning that companies with large total assets tend not to make voluntary PAF switching. Therefore, the following research hypothesis can be formulated:

H2: Firms size harms voluntary PAF switching.

3) Relationship between Auditor Reputation and Voluntary PAF Switching

Watts & Zimmerman [18] states that positive accounting research has developed in the theory of accounting practices and auditing practices. The need for monitoring of accounting and auditing practices can be explained in contracting theory. Auditor reputation is the Public Accounting Firm size measured by the type of PAF into the big four or non-big four PAF category. PAF big four is considered to have a better reputation when compared to PAF non the big four [23]. Consistent with Nasser's statement, et al. [39], PAF, the big four is considered more capable of maintaining an adequate independence level than the small PAF. However, companies that have been audited by the *big four* PAF do not PAF switching because they have received audit services according to company needs.

Based on this study results, the researcher suspects that Auditor reputation harms voluntary PAF turnover because companies audited by *non-big four* PAF tend to change *big four* PAF if they can pay for their audit services and vice versa. Companies that are audited by *big four* PAF will make changes to PAF voluntarily if the audit results are not in accordance with their expectations so that the following hypothesis can be formulated:

H3: Auditor reputation harms voluntary PAF turnover.

4) Modified Audit Opinion Moderates the Relationship between Financial Distress and Voluntary Turnover of Accounting Firms

The independent variable's relationship to the dependent variable through an indirect process can be explained by the variable that connects the

independent variable to the mediating variable, and the mediating variable as the cause of the dependent variable [24]. In this study, a modified auditor opinion is expected to clarify the relationship between financial distress and PAF's voluntary turnover. This is corroborated by several research results on modified auditor opinion and voluntary PAF switching.

Another research was done by Salleh & Jasmani [3] towards 156 companies in Malaysia that there is a relationship between auditor reputation and auditor qualified opinion. This causes the company to perform audit rotation from *big four* PAF to *non-big four* PAF. Consistent with the research of Suyono, Yi, & Riswan [25], the client's financial condition variable positively affects the PAF changing. This means that the client's financial condition that is not healthy will impact the PAF switching to find a cheaper PAF because it is unable to pay the previous PAF. Based on the results of this study, the researcher has a hypothesis formulation related to the effect of financial distress on voluntary PAF turnover with modified audit opinion as a mediating variable as follows:

H4: Modified audit opinion mediates the effect of financial distress on the voluntary turnover of accounting firms.

III. RESEARCH METHOD

This research is an explanatory study developed from several previous studies on the phenomenon of PAF turnover. This type of research is quantitative research, which is sourced from secondary data of manufacturing companies listed on the Stock Exchange, obtained from the 2014-2018 OSIRIS database. Sampling was done by purposive sampling, and companies that met the sample criteria were 5,546. The data used in the 5-year study, so the amount of data analyzed is 27,730 observational data.

A. Dependent Variable – Voluntary of the Public Accounting Firm

A voluntary of the public accounting firm is a change from one public accounting firm (PAF) to another, before the time determined by the applicable regulations. The PAF switching is seen from PAF data in Osiris regarding the year of the PAF agreement (*assignment date*) and the year of resignation (*resignation date*). If the PAF period from the agreement year to the resignation year is less than 5 years, it is categorized as a voluntary PAF switching. On the other hand, if the PAF during the agreement year and the year of resignation is 5 years, changing, the PAF does

not change voluntarily. Voluntary PAF turnover is measured using a nominal scale or dummy variable, where the number notation is 1 (one) if a company changes PAF voluntarily and notation 0 (zero) if a company does not do the PAF switching voluntarily.

The independent variable in this research consists of three variables, namely:

1) Financial Distress

Several measurements of financial distress variables have been carried out by previous studies. Chadegani et al. [6] use a dummy variable where the value of 1 is for companies experiencing financial distress and a value of 0 if the company does not experience financial distress. Assessments with a value category of 1 and a value of 0 are calculated using discriminant analysis, through the following steps:

a) Calculating the Zmijewski coefficient value based on 2014 as a basis for the formula:

$$Z = \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_3 \quad (1)$$

Z is the value of financial distress, which is denoted by a value of 0 if profitability is positive and a value of 1 if profitability is negative. The values of X1 are profitability (Net Profit/Total Assets), X2 Leverage (Total Debt/Total Assets) and X3 Liquidity (Current Assets/Current Debt).

b) After finding the coefficient value, this value is used to make financial distress predictions for the years 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018.

c) Using discriminant analysis, the value of the centroid, as the cut-off of a certain value, is determined as a limit to ascertain which company category is classified as having financial distress (value code 1) and which is experiencing financial distress (value code 0).

2) Firm's Size

A firm's size is measured using the following formula:

$$\text{Firm's size} = L_n \text{ Total Asset} \quad (2)$$

A firm's size for a period t is measured by the logarithm of the total assets for that period [9], [26], [27].

3) Auditor Reputation

Auditor reputation refers to the size of the PAF that is usually determined from the largest PAF earnings in the world, which re-grouped into the *big four* and *non-big four* PAF. According to Salleh and Jasmani [3], the PAFs that fall into the *big four* category are PAF Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, PAF PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), PAF Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler (KPMG) and PAF Ernst & Young (EY). In accordance with previous research, the size of a PAF is

determined using a dummy variable; if the company is audited by a *big four* PAF, a value of 1 is given, and if the company is audited by a *non-big four* PAF, the value of 0 is given [25], [28], [29].

B. Mediation Variable - Modified Auditor Opinion

In this study, the mediation variable is the modified auditor opinion. A modified auditor opinion is an auditor's opinion, not an unqualified opinion. A modified auditor opinion is measured using a dummy variable: if the company gets a modified auditor opinion, it is given the value of 1, and if the company gets a non-modified or unqualified opinion, the value of 0 is given [30].

The data analysis techniques used in this study were: 1) Discriminant analysis techniques to measure financial distress variables using a modified Zmijewski model; 2) Logistic regression analysis in stages. This logistic regression analysis is to explain the dependent variable in the dummy variable, to analyze the effect of the independent variable on the turnover of PAF [9], which was analyzed using the multivariate analysis application, International Business Machines Statistical Package for Social Sciences (IBM SPSS) Version 25 [40].

C. Research Framework

The research framework is a picture that explains the relationship between the variables described in the schema as an explanation of each hypothesis. In order to further clarify the research model, the research framework is presented in Figure 1 below:




Figure 1. Research framework

IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Based on the descriptive analysis, 64% of companies in China did voluntary PAF switching, 16% in Hong Kong, 72% in Indonesia, 7% in Japan, 24% in Malaysia, 9% in the Philippines, 17% in Singapore, 8% in Taiwan, and 40% in Thailand. Companies in 9 Southeast Asian and East Asian countries with the lowest rate of voluntary PAF turnover were companies in Japan, at 7%, followed by companies in the Philippines,

at 9%. This voluntary PAF switching shows that companies in Japan and the Philippines have a high commitment to and compliance with the rules that apply in a mandatory PAF switching. The companies that made the most changes to PAF voluntarily were companies in Indonesia, as much as 72%, and in China, as much as 64%.

The results of the analysis of research related to testing the positive effect of financial distress on voluntary PAF turnover, using logistic regression analysis, by including control variables of management change, audit committee and management ownership, and control year. It can be explained that financial distress has a positive effect on voluntary PAF turnover, or Hypothesis 1 supported with significance value $\alpha = 0.001$. This means that companies experiencing financial distress tend to do PAF switching before the specified time. Experiencing financial distress can influence a company to make a policy to do PAF switching before the specified time. If traced further, companies experiencing financial distress (i.e. companies that have negative profitability or companies that experience losses) will decide to move to a less costly PAF or move to a less stringent PAF so that the company's weaknesses are not detected. This is what causes the company's financial distress to affect the voluntary turnover of PAF.

The Hypothesis 2 test results show that a firm's size has a negative effect on the turnover of voluntary accounting firms, which supports Hypothesis 2. This means that a firm's size has a negative effect on voluntary PAF turnover with a significance value $\alpha = 0.000 < 0.05$. This shows that a firm's size has a negative effect on voluntary PAF turnover. The results show that companies that have large total assets tend to make decisions to do PAF switching voluntarily, and, on the other hand, companies that have small total assets tend not to make changes to PAF voluntarily. Large companies have the ability to replace PAF before the specified time, if they get an opinion other than unqualified. The decision to change this voluntary accounting firm was also influenced by changes in management and the existence of an audit committee in the company.

The results of the analysis of Hypothesis test 3 based on the table indicate that Hypothesis 3 is supported. This means that auditor reputation has a negative effect on voluntary accounting firm turnover with a significance value $\alpha = 0.00 < 0.05$. This shows that there is auditor reputation (PAF *big four* or PAF *non big four*), which is a factor that causes companies to adopt a policy of

changing PAF voluntarily. The results of this study indicate that companies audited by *big four* PAF tend not to make decisions to do PAF switching voluntarily, and, on the other hand, companies that are not audited by *big four* PAF tend to do PAF switching voluntarily. This is due to the client's trust in the *big four* PAF, which already have a good audit reputation in the implementation of the audit and satisfy the client, so that companies audited by *big four* PAF tend not to do PAF switching before the specified time or do PAF switching voluntarily.

Before analyzing Hypothesis 4, the researcher tested the effect of corporate financial distress on the modified auditor opinion and tested the effect of the modified auditor opinion on the voluntary turnover of PAF. The test results show that the financial distress factor has a positive effect on the modified auditor opinion with a significance value $\alpha = 0.035$, while the modified auditor opinion has a significant effect on the voluntary turnover of accounting firms with a significance value $\alpha = 0.000$. The next step is to test Hypothesis 4, to prove that modified auditor opinion mediates the effect of financial distress on voluntary turnover of accounting firms.

When viewed from the analysis results, it shows a significant influence on the variable modified auditor opinion on the turn of the voluntary accounting firm, and there is a significant positive financial distress effect on the change in the voluntary accounting firm. When viewed from the value $\beta_4 < \beta_1$, the conclusion of H4 is supported. This means that the modified auditor opinion variable mediates the effect of financial distress on PAF's voluntary turnover. Empirically, after analyzing this research on manufacturing companies in 9 countries, it proves that voluntary PAF switchings occur because the company experiences financial distress or because the company gets a modified auditor opinion. Modified auditor opinion as a variable that mediates financial distress on voluntary accounting firm turnover. Overall, in testing hypothesis 1 to hypothesis 4, it can be summarized in the following table:

Table 1.
Summary of logistic regression results - hypothesis testing

Information Variable	Coef.	Sign.	Conclusion	
Hypothesis 1	FD→AFS (direct impact)	0,417	0,001	H1 supported
	FD→AOM	0,798	0,035	Significant
	AOM→AFS	0,471	0,002	Significant
Hypothesis 2	FZ→AFS	-0,915	0,000	H2 supported
Hypothesis 3	AR→AFS	-2,550	0,000	H3 supported

FD → AOM →				
Hypothesis 4	AFS (indirect impact)	0,364	0,000	H4 supported

Based on the table, it can be seen that the direct effect of the variable financial distress on voluntary accounting firm turnover is a variable coefficient of 0.417, while the effect of financial distress on voluntary accounting firm turnover through modified auditor opinion has a coefficient of 0.364. This means that the modified auditor opinion is a partial mediating variable. The coefficient value of the financial distress variable is smaller than the direct effect through this indirect effect. It can be said that companies experiencing financial distress will have an impact on the modified auditor opinion, and this modified auditor opinion is the cause of the company to make changes to PAF before the appointed time.

V. CONCLUSION

The study results show that PAF's voluntary change is caused by several factors, namely financial distress, modified auditor opinion, firm size, and auditor reputation. Companies experiencing financial distress have an impact on the modified auditor's opinion, and the modified auditor's opinion is the reason for voluntary PAFs switching. Conversely, companies that do not have financial distress problems tend not to switch their PAF before the specified time. Financial distress is not a factor in voluntary PAF switching in China, Hong Kong, Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia, as the research sample shows that the financial distress variable is not a factor causing voluntary PAF switching.

Large companies tend not to switch PAFs voluntarily, while on the other hand, companies with small assets are prone to doing so. This is because large companies already have good systems and management, so that they are more likely to comply with the rules for changing PAFs. In contrast, companies with small assets tend to switch PAFs voluntarily because the commitment to conducting an audit is not based on the applicable rules, but on the audit results they obtain. The analysis per country – China, Hong Kong, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia – shows that large companies tend not to switch PAF voluntarily, while companies with small assets are more likely to do so.

This study also proves that companies audited by the *big four* PAFs tend to have policies about not changing PAFs voluntarily, in contrast to

companies audited by non-*big four* PAFs. This is because the former have good management systems, so they are more compliant with the rules of PAF replacement. The results of the analysis per country prove that companies audited by the *big four* PAFs are more likely to have policies on not changing PAFs voluntarily, as is the case in Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia. This means that employing the *big four* or non-*big four* PAFs is one of the causes of management policies regarding voluntary PAF switching. The management of a company may consider that the *big four* PAFs have superior expertise in conducting audits, or the independent implementation of audits is a factor for creating a voluntary PAF switching policy.

Finally, this study can prove that companies that get a modified audit opinion, other than unqualified, are a factor that links the impact of financial distress with the replacement of voluntary accounting firms. This is consistent with research connecting financial distress to audit qualified opinions [31] and audit opinion through PAF switching [32], [33]. If you look at the results of the analysis of each country in East and Southeast Asia, it shows that companies experiencing financial distress tend to get a modified auditor opinion, and a modified auditor opinion is the reason why a company changes PAF voluntarily. This condition occurs in the Philippines, Thailand, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.

VI. RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS

This research has theoretical implications that strengthen agency theory. So far, agency theory has only been used as a difference between agent and principal, but this study proves that agency theory shows the role of the auditor as a monitoring function for management. This research also proves that it supports the contract theory, where the change in PAF is limited by the contract between the company and the auditor. The important theoretical implications in this study are the measurement of financial distress variables using the modified Zmijewski model in accordance with the financial prediction conditions of 9 countries.

1) The determination of the financial distress model using the new Zmijewski is said to be a modified Zmijewski model.

2) It proves that the factors that influence the turnover of voluntary accounting firms are not only directly influenced by financial distress, firm size, auditor reputation or modified auditor opinion, but this study succeeds in proving that

modified auditor opinion is a mediating variable or indirect influence of financial variables.

A. Distress to Voluntary PAF Turnover

In addition, the theoretical implication that needs to be explained is that the factors that influence the turnover of voluntary accounting firms in each country are not the same. This is due to the level of compliance of each country in understanding the rules for changing PAF.

This study has policy implications that can be used as a consideration for the policies of the Public Accountant Professional Organization in Southeast Asia regarding PAF switching. The rules that have been determined by the Ministry of Finance need to be properly monitored by professional organization within companies so that they comply with the applicable regulations and the independence of auditors in conducting audits is well maintained.

B. Research Limitations and Suggestions

The limitation of this research is that this research was conducted before the outbreak of the coronavirus (COVID-19) in 2020, so the voluntary PAF switching due to a company's financial distress is likely to be very different from 2019. Therefore, there are probably many factors that are involved. The results of this study have proved that the variables that influence voluntary PAF turnover, in addition to financial distress, firm size, auditor reputation and modified auditor opinion influence a firm's decision to do PAF switching before the appointed time.

Suggestions for future research should be that future researchers use variables that can influence voluntary PAF turnover with other variables, such as corporate governance and audit fees. While control variables for management change, audit committee and management ownership do not prove voluntary PAF switching, it is suggested to directly test them as direct independent variables, or research the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on the policy of auditor switching.

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